To Professor S. A. Cook of Cambridge
הוד לפלדה ו חכם וודה על חודה

RABBINIC METHODS OF INTERPRETATION
AND HELLENISTIC RHETORIC

DAVID DAUBE, Cambridge, England

The way in which the Rabbis built up the colossal system of Talmudic law by means of an exegesis of the relatively few provisions contained in the Bible is still a mystery. To outsiders, the whole development appears arbitrary, a mass of sophistic and involved deductions governed by no coherent first principles and serving no valid communal needs. Orthodox Jews affirm that the methods used by the Rabbis and the results reached by them are of Sinaiic origin: God revealed them all to Moses during the forty days Moses stayed with him, and Moses, though not writing them down, transmitted them to Joshua, Joshua to the elders and so on. This dogma goes back to the Talmud itself and, as we shall see, it made good sense in that period; but, as proposed today, it amounts to an admission that the evolution cannot be justified on rational grounds. Some liberal Jewish scholars, on the other hand, have tried to shew that the Rabbis were guided by pure logic. But that is hardly more convincing. No real attempt, however, has so far been made to understand the growth of Talmudic law against its historical background, and to investigate the relationship with other Hellenistic systems of law, such as the Greek ones or the Roman. The reasons for this failure are not far to seek. Apart from the usual difficulties where several fields of study are concerned, the modern expo-

* One of four lectures on Talmudic law delivered at the London School of Oriental and African Studies in the Winter 1948-9.

* Adolf Schwarz's works are the outstanding example of this sort.
ments of Greek and Roman law are often quite unaware of some of the mainsprings of their systems, namely, the conventions among the ancient jurists as to types of arguments admissible or inadmissible, the relative weight of arguments and the like. But it is precisely in this province of 'legal science' that may be found the really important points of contact between the Talmud and other Hellenistic creations.

The thesis here to be submitted is that the Rabbinic methods of interpretation derive from Hellenistic rhetoric. Hellenistic rhetoric is at the bottom both of the fundamental ideas, presuppositions, from which the Rabbis proceeded and of the major details of application, the manner in which these ideas were translated into practice. This is not to detract from the value of the work of the Rabbis. On the contrary, it is important to note that, when the Hellenistic methods were first adopted, about 100 to 25 B.C., the 'classical,' Tannaitic era of Rabbinic law was just opening. That is to say, the borrowing took place in the best period of Talmudic jurisprudence, when the Rabbis were masters, not slaves, of the new influences. The methods taken over were thoroughly hebraized in spirit as well as form, adapted to the native material, worked out so as to assist the natural progress of Jewish law. It is the kind of thing which, mutatis mutandis, happened at Rome in the same epoch. Later on, from A.D. 200, in 'post-classical,' Amoraic law, the development was in several respects more autonomous, less open to foreign inspiration, yet at the same time there was a distinct lack of vitality and originality, the most prominent tendency now being ever greater specialization. However, in its beginnings, the Rabbinic system of hermeneutics is a product of the Hellenistic civilization then dominating the entire Mediterranean world.

Let us begin by recalling a few matters concerning date and geography. It is to Hillel, the great Pharisee who flourished about 30 B.C., that we owe the oldest rules in accordance with which Scripture is to be nidrashtah, 'interpreted.' He himself says that he learned them from his teachers Shemaiah and

---


---

241

Abtalton, and, indeed, they are the first Rabbis to be called darshanim, 'interpreters of Scripture.' The Talmud represents them as proselytes. The historicity of this feature has been doubted; but it is agreed that, if they were not natives of Alexandria, they studied and taught there long enough to go on using Egyptian measures even after settling in Palestine. So there is a prima facie case for a direct connection between Hillel's seven norms of interpretation and Alexandria, a centre of Hellenistic scholarship.

The historical situation in which Hillel found himself may next be considered. For centuries before him, Scripture had been subjected to the most scrupulous philological analysis, each word, and sentence being inspected with a view to establishing its exact sense and grammatical status. But treated in this conservative manner, the Bible yielded comparatively little law; and it is not surprising that a large body of law, religious and secular, grew up in addition to that contained in Scripture. This non-Scriptural law consisted of various elements. Some of it indeed

---

4 Palestinian Pes. 33a, Babylonian Pes. 66a.
5 Bab. Pes. 70b, a passage all the more reliable as it is a Sadducee who describes them as such, and probably in a sneering tone: 'It is curious that these wonderful interpreters of Scripture did not realize . . . '
7 Bab. Kid. 30a says that sofer, 'scribe,' originally meant 'one who counts;' the ancient scribes counted all the letters in the Bible. Whatever the original meaning of the word, there is no reason to doubt the information concerning the activity of the early scholars. We can go further. Most, if not all, of the early gezeroth shawoth (inferences from analogy, in accordance with the second of Hillel's norms of interpretation) are based on expressions which occur only in the two passages concerned and nowhere else in the Bible (Schwarz, Die Hermeneutische Analogie, 61 ff.). Thus the Mekhiltha tells us that from the use of 'asher lo' orasas in Ex. 22.15 (16) and Deut. 22.28 it follows that the penalty is 30 shekels for seduction (Exodus) just as for rape (Deuteronomy). The phrase 'asher lo' orasas occurs only in these two verses. It is safe to conclude that there existed, before Hillel, collections of asher lo' orasas. The norm of gezerah shawah would have been impracticable without them. How far even this old, narrowly grammatical and lexicographical analysis and statistics may have been influenced by Greek ideas we need not here decide. In Rome, Varro, about 100 B.C., wrote monographs about synonyms, about the formation of words, about rare words in Plautus. He followed Greek models.
was still almost Scriptural: the meaning of an obscure verse would be fixed, a very inconvenient precept would be credited with a somewhat more desirable meaning, the claims of flagrantly inconsistent ordinances would be settled. But a great part was avowedly novel, extensions of Biblical provisions designed to deal with fresh cases or also, in the words ascribed to the men of the Great Synagogue, 'to make a fence around the Torah.' In either case, what was the ground of recognition of this vast body of non-Scriptural law? It was the authority of the people promulgating it. The correctness of a decision was guaranteed by the character and learning of him who delivered it. Significantly, the *dibhere sopherim*, the 'sayings of the ancient scribes,' are never supported by any arguments. The wise man simply knows the true import of a Biblical commandment or the proper supplement to add.

The non-Scriptural law was aptly termed 'the tradition received from, or handed down by, the fathers,' πατέρων διαδοχή or παράδοσις τῶν πατέρων, gabbalah ha-aboth, masoreth ha-aboth. From Akiba's statement, about A. D. 120, that 'tradition is a fence around the Torah,' we may gather that the extensions for the purpose of ensuring strictest observance of the Biblical law were regarded as the chief component of the non-Biblical; and it may be remarked, in passing, that this adage is surely indebted — however indirectly — to Plato's praise of 'ancestral customs which, if well established, form a cover around the written laws for their full protection.'

The trouble was that important groups refused to consider the tradition binding, above all, the Sadducees (but also the Samaritans). For them, the text of the Bible was of God, but nothing beyond it. The Pharisaic 'fence' they rejected and even ridiculed. When the Pharisees insisted on purification of the golden candlestick in the Temple in case it had contracted some uncleanness, the Sadducees commented: 'Look how they purify the light of the moon!'

Josephus has an interesting remark: the Sadducees, he says, hold it a virtue to dispute against their own teachers. Evidently, they had taken over from the Hellenistic schools of philosophy the ideal of working out any problem by unfettered argument and counter-argument. Their encounter with Jesus in the New Testament provides support: they attempt to reduce to absurdity the belief in a resurrection of the body, and the point they make might well figure in a philosophical dialogue of the time. It is worth noting that very similar arguments — also in the form of 'teasers' — are attributed to the Talmud to the citizens of Alexandria and (which comes to the same thing) to Queen Cleopatra.

---

1 Mishnah Ab. 1.1.
2 Josephus, Ant. 13.10.6, Targum on Jb 15.18. Λ συνώνυμον is παράδοσις τῶν πατέρων, occurring in Matthew 15:2, Mark 7:3, 5; it would correspond to masoreth ha-segenim (cp. *dibhere ha-segenim*, e. g. in Tosep. Rakoth 3b).
3 Mishnah Ab. 3.14. Certainly, for Akiba, masoreth had come to signify, more specifically, 'the tradition concerning the exact state of the sacred text' (see Bacher, *Alteste Terminologie*, 108, *Tradition und Tradenten*, 3). But for one thing, it must not be forgotten that this particular branch was of such importance for him precisely because — in opposition to Ishmael — he used technicalities like the presence or absence of the optional accusative sign for deriving fresh law; hence 'the tradition concerning the state of the text' so to speak swallowed up the tradition of the fathers in general, it more or less represented the entire oral Law. For another thing, the adage 'tradition is a fence around the Torah' is doubtless older than Akiba, dating from a time when masoreth had its original, wider sense. The point of Abhath 3.14 is the putting together of this maxim with 'tithes are a fence around riches' etc.
There were, then, these diametrically opposed views: the Pharisaic, according to which the authority of the fathers must be unconditionally accepted, and the Sadducean, according to which the text alone was binding, while any question not answered by it might be approached quite freely, in a philosophical fashion. In this situation, Hillel\(^4\) declared that Scripture itself included the tradition of the fathers; and that it did so — here he took a leaf out of the other party's book — precisely if read vol. 1, 897), thinks that 'Cleopatra' must be emended because she was not contemporary with Meir, A. D. 159, to whom she is represented as talking. But Talmudic legend was never afraid of anachronisms, and whoever wanted to indicate that Meir's opponents were Alexandrians, i.e. druids to Greek philosophy, might find Cleopatra particularly suitable in view of the rather improper flavour of the question. A most unsavoury story is told about her in Bab. Nid. 30b.\(^6\)

"The Talmud is fully aware of the decisive role played by him; he is compared to Ezra in Bab. Suk. 20a, Sota 48b. The four legends in Bab. Shab. 30b l. are designed to illustrate (inter alia) four cardinal teachings of his: (1) every question deserves a well-reasoned answer, (2) tradition must inevitably command some authority, (3) by applying the norms of interpretation, the entire Law might be inferred from a single, ethical principle, and (4) the tradition of the fathers contains nothing but what follows from Scripture on proper exegesis. Ad (1): Somebody asks Hillel questions like 'Why have the Babylonians such round heads?,' to which he replies 'A weighty question — because they have no skilful midwives.' Ad (2): A gentle undertakes to become a convert if he need submit only to the written Law. The severe Shammai rejects him, Hillel accepts him. The first day, he teaches him the Hebrew alphabet; the second, he reverses the order of the letters. The proselyte protests, whereupon Hillel tells him that if he trusts him as to the alphabet, he might do so as to the oral Torah. Ad (3): A gentle undertakes to become a convert if he can be taught the entire Torah while standing on one foot. Shammai rejects him, Hillel accepts him. He teaches him 'What is hateful to you, do not to your fellowman,' all the rest, he says, is interpretation. Ad (4): A gentle undertakes to become a convert if he will be made High Priest. Shammai rejects him, Hillel accepts him. In the course of his instruction, Num. 1.51 is reached: 'And the stranger that cometh nigh shall be put to death.' Hillel explains that even King David is a 'stranger' for this purpose, whereupon his pupil, by a qal wa hapner, an inference a minori ad majus, deduces the utter unfitness of a proselyte. He then returns to Shammai to ask him why he dogmatized instead of drawing his attention to Num. 1.51 once he (the convert) knew that verse, and the method of qal wa hapner, be himself (the convert) agreed with the traditional attitude, be himself shuddled at his original request.

as, on the most up-to-date teaching of the philosophical schools, a code of laws ought to be read. There existed, he claimed, a series of rational norms of exegesis making possible a sober clarification and extension of legal provisions. If they were applied to Scripture, the opinions expressed by the fathers would be vindicated, would turn out to be logical, not arbitrary; and in fact, he contended, some measure of traditional, Rabbinic authority would always remain indispensable — not everybody was in a position to judge the merits of a doctrine approved by the experts.\(^8\) While this part of his program was addressed to the Sadducees, he pointed out to his own group that his hermeneutics, if they vindicated the tradition of the fathers, must themselves enjoy a degree of sanctity and be put to further use: the tradition of the fathers (he urged) had evidently been evolved along these lines all the time. His first public debate before the Pharisaic officers — on the question whether the paschal lamb might be slaughtered even if Passover fell on a Sabbath — culminated in the demonstration that what he concluded from the Bible by means of his system of interpretation coincided with the traditional ruling. It was then that the Pharisees made him their leader and accepted his innovation.\(^9\) Let us just note that the very setting of this historic debate was that of the 'disputatio fori.'\(^10\)

Hillel, by introducing this system into Talmudic jurisprudence, accomplished two things. He not only created the basis for a development of the law at the same time orderly and unlimited,\(^11\) but also led the way towards: bridging of the gulf

\(^4\) See the legends numbered (2) and (4) in the preceding footnote. According to Pal. Pes. 33a, Hillel went from Babylonia to Palestine in order to get it confirmed that the results of his interpretation agreed with tradition. Jesus' reply to the question about resurrection (see above, p. 243) is twofold: he not only propounds a theological argument — there might be a rejoinder to that — but also quotes a verse from Scripture to be taken as alluding to a quickening of the dead.

\(^6\) Pal. Pes. 33a, Bab. Pes. 66a.

\(^10\) That ancient Roman 'interpretation' assumed the form of a public debate is stated in D. 1.2.2.5. A vivid illustration may be found in Cicero, De Or. 1.56.240; see below, p. 246 n. 24.

\(^11\) The possibilities of the new method were clearly seen from the outset,
between Pharisees and Sadducees. On the one hand, he upheld the authority of tradition. Actually, in a sense, he increased it: as, for him, the traditional decisions were all logical, necessary inferences from the Bible, they were equal in rank to the latter. He went as far as to speak of two Torah, a written one and an oral one — an idea governing all subsequent thought. On the other hand, his modern, scientific technique and, above all, the very conception of the oral Torah as deriving from, and thus essentially inherent in, the text implied a profound appreciation of the Sadducean standpoint and must have brought over a good many who embraced it. Clearly, his work in this field was not the least of his achievements in the service of unity and peace.

We may now examine the main ideas underlying Hillel's program.

First, the fundamental antithesis he tried to overcome was that between law resting on the respect for a great man, on the authority of tradition, and law resting on rational, intelligible considerations. This antithesis is common in the rhetorical literature of the time. His contemporary Cicero distinguishes between arguments from the nature of the case and arguments from external evidence, that is to say, from authority. An example of the latter type would be the decision: 'Since Scaevola said so and so, this must be taken as the law.' In 137 B.C., Cicero reports, P. Crassus, after first 'taking refuge in authorities,' had to admit that Galba's 'disputation' founded on arguments from analogy and equity led to a more plausible result.

as emerges from legend (3), above, p. 244 n. 17: all Law might at a pinch he deduced from one principle.

Bah. Shab. 31a. Shammai also used these terms: in this respect, there was no disagreement between him and Hillel. The equality of the oral Torah is strikingly brought out by the fact that the principle from which, in Hillel's view, the entire Law might be deduced, 'What is hateful . . . ' (see legend (3), above, p. 244 n. 17), belongs, not to Scripture, but to traditional ethics.

10 Top. 2.8. 4.24 ('quae autem adsumuntur extrinsecus, ea maxime ex auctoritate ducuntur, ut si respondeas: quoniam P. Scaevola dixerit, id tibi ius videri'). Cp. Aristotle, Rhet. 2.23.12, Quintilian 5.11.36.

11 De Or. 1.56.240 ('Galba autem multas similitudines afferre multaque pro aequitate contra ius dicere; atque illum ad auctores confugisse, ac tamen

Secondly, Hillel claimed that any gaps in Scriptural law might be filled in with the help of certain modes of reasoning — a good, rhetorical theory. Cicero has much to say about 'ratioction,' by which 'from that which is written there is derived a further point not written,' while Auctor ad Herennium defines 'ratioction' as the method to be applied where 'the judge has to deal with a case not falling under a statute of its own, yet covered by other statutes in view of a certain analogy.'

Thirdly, the result of such interpretation was to be of the same status as the text itself, to be treated as if directly enjoined by the original lawgiver. This view also can be paralleled. Of a certain institution, Gaius tells us that it is called 'statutory' because 'though there is no express provision about it in the statute (the XII Tables), yet it has been accepted through interpretation as if it had been introduced by the statute.'

Another time he even omits the 'as if,' representing as laid down by the XII Tables a rule in reality deduced from that code by its interpreters. As is well known, the term ius civil is occasionally employed for the body of law evolved by interpretation. This reflects a stage where the law evolved by interpretation was so different from, and so much fuller than, the statute law to which it attached that it had practically buried the latter and usurped its place.

concessisse Galbae disputationem sibi probabilem videri'). Of course, it was also possible to 'dispute,' 'interpret a statute,' so as to reach results in conflict with equity; D. 50.16.177, 50.17.65.

De Inv. 1.13.17 ('ex eo quod scriptum est aliud quod non scriptum est inveniri'); cp. 2.50.148 ff.

1.13.23 ('cum res sine prorsa lege venit in iudicium, quae tamen ab aliis legis similitudine quadam occupatur'); cp. Aristotle, Rhet. 2.23.1 ff., Quintilian 7.8.3 ff.

1.165 ('quae tutela legitima vocatur, non quia nominatim ea lege de hac tutela cavetur, sed quia prindpe accepta est per interpretationem atque si verbis legis introducta esset'); cp. 3.218. The term sua condere may have originated as describing the activity of the ancient interpreters; see C. 4.35.

2.422: 'fundu vero et aedium biennio, et ita lege XII tabularum cautum est'. The XII Tables, as Gaius doubtless knew, mentioned only fundus, the interpreters, reasoning from analogy, added aedes; Cicero, Top. 4.23, Pro Cae. 19.54.

D. 1.2.2.5, 12.
Fourthly, Hillel's assumption of 'a written Torah and an oral Torah' is highly reminiscent of the pair νόμος ἲγγράφως and νόμος ἲγγράφως or ius scriptum and ius non scriptum (or per manus traditum). It is superfluous to adduce references, but it may be worth noting that the terms νόμος ἲγγράφως and ius non scriptum do not always signify the natural law common to all men. They frequently signify the traditional, customary law of a particular community as opposed to its statute law.18 Plato, in the same section where he describes the customs of the fathers as a protective covering around the written laws, says expressly that 'what people call customs of the fathers are nothing else than the sum of unwritten laws.'19 They are even used of the law created by the interpreters of statutes.20 Since, on the other hand, Hillel's 'oral Torah' was still of a wide range, embracing ethics as well as law in the narrow sense, his dependence on Hellenistic philosophy seems beyond doubt.

Fifthly, there is an idea which at first sight looks the exclusive property of the Rabbis, for whom the Bible had been composed under divine inspiration: the lawgiver foresaw the interpretation of his statutes, deliberately confined himself to a minimum, relying on the rest being inferable by a proper exegesis. (It is this idea which gradually led to the doctrine that the oral Law no less than the written is of Sinaitic origin: God, by word of mouth, revealed to Moses both the methods by which fresh precepts might be derived from Scripture and all precepts that would ever be in fact derived.) But even this is a stock argument of the orators. Cicero observes that the application of a statute

18 Aristotle, Rhet. 1.13.2 (ὁ λέγω δὲ νόμον ἓνδο εἰς τὸν ἐκάστος ὑποτύπωσι πρὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ τοὺς τῶν μὲν ἄγγραφον τὸν δὲ ἄγγραφον, καὶ τὸν κατὰ φάσιν), also D. 1.1.6.1, 1.3.32 pr., 1.2.3.9. That ius scriptum as understood in the Digest is not quite the same as the statute law in the modern sense need hardly be mentioned. The term per manus traditum is, of course, always confined to the custom of a certain people; cp. Livy 5.51.4. D. 29.7.10.

19 Laws 7.793a (ὅς πατρίου νόμου ἐπινόμαζον, ὥς ἴλλα ἵστιν ἡ τὰ τοῦτα ἄγγραφος ἀναφέρεσθαι. In the Statesman, ἀναφέρεσθαι or ἄγγραφος is regularly paired off with πάτρως, e.g. 295a, 296d f.

20 Cicero, De Inv. 1.13.17, 2.50.146, Quintilian 7.8.3, D. 1.2.3.5, 12; see above, p. 245 n. 20, p. 247 nn. 25, 26, 29.

to a case not mentioned in it may be justified by pleading that the lawgiver omitted the case 'because, having written about another, allied one, he thought nobody could have any doubt about this one,' or that 'in many laws many points are omitted which, however, no one would consider as really omitted, since they can be deduced from other points that are put down.'21 Auctor ad Herennium advises him who wishes to go beyond the letter of a law to 'extol the appropriateness'22 and brevity of the author's style, since he put down only as much as was necessary, but deemed it unnecessary to put down what could be understood without being put down; only by going beyond the letter are we giving effect to 'the will of the author.'23 When Sabinus extended a mode of assessment prescribed in the first chapter of the lex Aquilia to the third where it was not prescribed, he maintained that 'the lawgiver thought it sufficient to have used the relevant word in the first chapter.'24 The Romans inherited the idea from the Greeks. Lysias, for instance, asserts that the lawgiver who declared punishable the use of certain offensive words in the third where he describes the customs of the fathers as a protective covering around the written laws, says expressly that 'what people call customs of the fathers are nothing else than the sum of unwritten laws.' They are even used of the law created by the interpreters of statutes. Since, on the other hand, Hillel's 'oral Torah' was still of a wide range, embracing ethics as well as law in the narrow sense, his dependence on Hellenistic philosophy seems beyond doubt.

Fifthly, there is an idea which at first sight looks the exclusive property of the Rabbis, for whom the Bible had been composed under divine inspiration: the lawgiver foresaw the interpretation of his statutes, deliberately confined himself to a minimum, relying on the rest being inferable by a proper exegesis. (It is this idea which gradually led to the doctrine that the oral Law no less than the written is of Sinaitic origin: God, by word of mouth, revealed to Moses both the methods by which fresh precepts might be derived from Scripture and all precepts that would ever be in fact derived.) But even this is a stock argument of the orators. Cicero observes that the application of a statute

21 De Inv. 2.50.159 f. ('idcirco de hac re nihil esse scriptum quod, cum de illa esset scriptum, de hac is qui scribatet dubitatur neminem arbitratur sit . . . multis in legibus multa praeterita esse quae idcirco praeterita nemo arbitetur quod ex ceteris de quibus scriptum sit intelligi possit'); cp. 2.47.39 f., 2.50.152, De Leg. 2.7.18.

22 Cp. commodissime in Cicero, De Inv. 2.50.152, cited in the preceding footnote.

23 2.10.14 ('laudabimus scriptorium commodissimum atque brevissimum, quod tantum scripserit quod neceesse fuerit, illud quod sine scripto intellegi putaretur non necessario scribendum putaverit . . . contra eum qui scriptum recitet et scriptoris voluntatem non interpretetur'); cp. 2.12.18.

24 G. 3.218: 'näm legislatorem contentiam fuisse quod prima parte eo verbo usus esset.' Note the close similarity in expression to Auct. ad Her. 2.10.14, 2.12.18, cited in the preceding footnote. I. 4.3.15 says: 'näm plebs Romanam, quae hanc legem tulit, contentiam fuisse.' Possibly, Tribonian no longer understood the doctrine of interpretation underlying Sabinus' remark and believed that the omission in the third chapter was to be explained by the character of the lex Aquilia as a plebiscite, the plebs being a careless and lazy lawgiver.

25 Contra Theonn. I 8 (περὶ ἐνὸς περὶ περὶ παύσων ἐξήλθον); cp. also (despite important differences) Aristotle, Rhet. 1.13.13, 17, in turn dependent on Plato, Statesman 294A ff.
and Romans could talk in this 'religious' way, it should be remembered that there had been periods when their ancient legislations also enjoyed a semi-divine standing, much as the Bible did among the Jews.

Sixthly, it is the task of a lawgiver to lay down basic principles only, from which any detailed rules may be inferred. Just so, Cicero, in the imaginary role of a legislator, announces that 'the statutes will be set forth by me, not in a complete form— that would be endless—but in the form of generalized questions and their decisions; and according to Suetonius, Caesar planned to replace the embarrassing mass of statues by a few books, containing what was best and necessary. 15

Seventhly, it is the task of a lawgiver, if he wants to regulate a series of allied cases, to choose the most frequent and leave the others to be inferred on the ground of analogy. 16 Just so, Cicero argues that the edict directed against violence with the help of men 'brought together' covers the case where men had assembled uninvited and were then made to participate in some violence; the edict is framed in this way because 'normally, where numbers are needed, men are brought together,' but 'though the word may be different, the substance is not, and the same law will apply, to all cases where it is clear that the same principle of equity is at stake.' 17 In opening that half of his Digest where he discusses leges and senatusconsulta, Julian explains that neither 'can be formulated so as to comprise all cases that may


16 It is not certain that this idea goes back to Hillel's time, but it cannot be much later: see Mishnah Edhuyoth 1.12, where the School of Shammah accounts for a traditional ruling, which they desire to extend, by saying that it speaks about 'what happens normally,' i.e. gives only the principal example. By Ishamel's age, the idea was fully established.

17 Pro Caece, 21.59 ('quia plurumque, ubi multitudine opus est, homines cogi solent, idee de coactis compositum interdictum est; quod etiam verbo differre videbitur, re tamen erit unum, et omnibus in causis idem valebit in quibus perspiciatur una atque eadem causa aequitatis').

occur at any time, but it is sufficient that the most frequent happenings should be regulated. 18

Hillel's jurisprudence, then, i.e. his theory of the relation between statute law, tradition and interpretation, was entirely in line with the prevalent Hellenistic ideas on the matter. The same is true of the details of execution, of the methods he proposed to give practical effect to his theory. The famous seven norms of hermeneutics he proclaimed, the seven norms in accordance with which Scripture was to be interpreted, hitherto looked upon as the most typical product of Rabbinism, all of them betray the influence of the rhetorical teaching of his age.

The first of these norms is the inference a fortiori, or a minori ad maius—in Hebrew gal wahomer, 'the light and the weighty.' Ex. 20.25 gives permission to build the altar of stone, brick or anything else. 19 By means of a gal wahomer, it is concluded that, since the material may be chosen in the case of this most important object of the Temple, it may a fortiori be chosen for the other, less important objects. The second, third and fourth norms in Hillel's plan are various kinds of inferences from analogy. For example, just as the daily sacrifice, which Scripture says should be brought 'at its appointed time,' is due even on a Sabbath, so the Passover lamb, which Scripture also demands 'at its appointed time,' must be slaughtered even if Passover falls on a Sabbath. 20 Rhetorical parallels abound. 'What applies to the maius,' says Cicero, 'must apply also to the minus, and vice versa.' Again, what applies to one thing must apply to that which is equal. 21 To discover the meaning of a problematic

18 D. 1.3.10; see Lenel, Palingenesis, vol. 1, 464 ('neque leges neque senatusconsulta ita scribi possunt ut omnes causae qui quandoque inciderint comprehendantur, sed sufficit ea quae plurumque accident continenti').

19 At least that was what the Rabbis took to be the force of 'if' in 'And if thou wilt make me an altar of stones:' Mekhiltha ad loc. For the present purpose, it is immaterial whether or not this view is tenable.

20 Pal. Pes. 33a, Bab. Pes. 66a, Num. 28.2, 9.2. The writer refrains from being more explicit about Hillel's second, third and fourth norms because their original nature and history has not so far been appreciated, but it would lead too far afield here to go into them. For a certain aspect of the second, gezerah shavvah, see above, p. 241 n. 7.

21 Top. 4.23: 'quod in re maiore valet valere in minore, item contra;
phrase, its 'normal force,' the 'usage of language' and the 'analogy and examples of those who have used it' will have to be considered; and the definition should not 'clash with the usage in the writings of others, certainly not with that in other writings by the same author.'

It might perhaps be objected that it is so natural to argue a fortiori or from analogy that the parallels cannot prove any borrowing on Hillel's part. Postponing this problem for a moment, we would draw attention to the arrangement of his norms: first a fortiori, then analogy. One could imagine the reverse order. But it is interesting that, right from Aristotle, wherever in rhetorical literature the methods of interpretation are set forth in a tabulated form, this is the order we find. We have already quoted Cicero: 'What applies to the mainus must apply to the minus, and vice versa; what applies to one thing must apply to the other which is equal.' Auctor ad Herennium declares that the first thing to be asked when filling the gaps of the law by 'ratiocination' is 'whether anything comparable has been laid down concerning greater, smaller or equal matters.' There is a standard sequence, and it is observed in Hillel's list.

Still deferring the question of the naturalness of his first four norms, let us proceed to the fifth, which is more complicated, the rule of 'the general and the specific,' ketal Uttar. It says that if the range of a statute is indicated both by a wider and a narrower term, it is the one put second that counts; that is to say, if the narrower term comes second, it restricts the wider

[14] DAVID DAUBE

[15] RABBINIC METHODS OF INTERPRETATION
complete absence of any servitudes, yet I believe the second clause releases him sufficiently to limit his responsibility to such servitudes as were imposed through himself.  

11 The specific term, the perat, which comes second, restricts the general one, the kelal, which comes first.

To turn now to the question we have put off: can it be argued that the first four norms of Hillel are so natural that the rhetorical parallels constitute no evidence of a genetic connection? For one thing, the argument is greatly weakened by the existence of parallels to the fifth norm, of the general and the specific, which is rather subtle (not to mention the Hellenistic colouring of Hillel's doctrine of the role of interpretation as a whole). But even the first four are not so very simple. If we take as illustration the inference a fortiori — to be sure, any layman might reason thus: 'Here is a teetotaller who does not touch alcohol; he will certainly refuse whisky.' Three points, however, must not be overlooked. First, the deduction will not always be made in this direct, almost technical manner; more often than not there will be some twist somewhere. Secondly, the ordinary person will rarely perceive the exact nature of his deduction. There is a considerable difference between merely using various modes of deduction and being aware of using just these modes, defining, distinguishing and tabulating them. Thirdly, the recommendation of a series of such modes of deduction as an instrument — or indeed, as the only satisfactory instrument — with which to build up a complete legal or theological system manifestly involves a further step. Medieval Icelandic law is of a high standard; if the norms of exegesis here discussed were so natural,

we should expect to find them there, but there is no trace of them. Actually, it is by no means clear to what extent our modern lawyers are consciously applying a coherent system of hermeneutics.

A comparison between the Old Testament and the New is instructive. Both contain inferences a fortiori; the Old Testament cases were already collected by the Rabbis of the Talmud (occasionally, indeed, their eyes were too sharp). But there is a difference. The Old Testament cases are popular, the New Testament ones technical. A good Old Testament instance is the reply of Joseph's brothers when accused of the theft of his cup: 'The money which we found in our sacks' mouths we brought again unto thee — how then should we steal silver or gold?' Apart from a slight irregularity in the structure of the argument — an action, 'we brought again,' in the premise, an omission, 'we did not steal,' in the conclusion — it is relevant to note that the statement occurs in the course of a dispute concerning facts, namely, the guilt or innocence of Joseph's brothers. It is a far cry from here to the methodical elaboration of law and theology by means of the norm a minior ad maius. This stage, however, is reached by the time of the New Testament. According to Matthew, Jesus, asked about healing on the Sabbath, answered: 'What man shall have one sheep, and if it fall into a pit, will not he lift it out? How much better then is a man than a sheep! Wherefore it is lawful to do well on the sabbath.' According to Luke, he argued: 'Doth not each man on the sabbath loose his ox for the watering? And ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound these eighteen years, be loosed? These are academic, 'Halakhic'

11 Gen. 44.8.
12 A perfectly straight inference a fortiori would run either 'we did not retain the money found, still less did we steal' or 'we brought again the money found, still more did we refrain from stealing.'
13 Matthew 12.10 ff.
14 Luke 13.14 ff. It is interesting that the mode of reasoning is the same as in Matthew 12.10 ff., a gal wahomer, though the substance of the argument is not a little different. The argument of Luke 14.3 ff., on the other hand, is very close to Matthew 12.10 ff. in substance, but there is no longer an obvious gal wahomer. If we did not know Matthew 12.10 ff. and Luke 13.14 ff., we
applications of Hillel's first rule of exegesis. No less significant an example may be met with in Paul's theological discourse: 'While we were yet sinners, Christ died for us; much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him.'\(^{39}\) The technique is exactly the same as that of the Roman jurists, whose 'ratiocination' respecting the lex Aelia Sentia is recorded by Gaius. The statute laid down that the property of certain dediciti should on death be treated like that of citizen freedmen. The jurists, however, decided that the dediciti were not thereby given the citizen freedmen's power of making a will: seeing that even Junian Latinis, superior in status to dediciti, were incapable of making a will, it could not have been the lawgiver's intention to grant this facility to 'men of the very lowest rank.'\(^{40}\)

The point is that Hillel's system — and not only the first four norms\(^{41}\) — is 'natural' in the sense of 'grown out of intelligent

should probably see in Luke 14.5 a reasoning from analogy: as one may help a beast, so one may a man.

\(^{39}\) Romans 5.8.f. much more = τολῶν μᾶλλον, vastly more. John 13.14 is curious. According to the prevalent reading, Jesus, as Lord and Master, sets an example, ὑπόθεσις, to be imitated by his disciples; this idea recurs in many passages of the New Testament. But DΘ it is by insert τόσον μᾶλλον before καὶ μικρὸς ὑπερέχει, thus turning the argument into a technical ἕλεος homerie: if the Master performs this servile duty, a fortiori the disciples must do it.

\(^{40}\) 3.75: 'passimae conditionis humanitas.' Note the ascription of the result to the will of the lawgiver; cp. above, pp. 248 ff. The term incredibile is technical in rhetorical hermeneutics: serissimile or credible designates what may be presumed, in view of all circumstances or on 'ratiocination,' to be the import of an arrangement or law, incredibile what cannot be regarded as such. See e.g. Cicero, De Inv. 2.40.117, D. 12.4.6.pr., 15.1.9.4, 15.1.5.7, 18.1.39.1, 19.1.13.22, 20.1.6, 20.4.13, 28.6.41.5, 30.1.47 pr., 34.2.8, 34.5.24, 35.1.25, 35.1.34, 48.19.41, 50.16.142, 50.17.114. Later the exclusion of dediciti was based not on an inference a minori ad maius, but on an entirely different argument: Ulp. 20.14.

\(^{41}\) The fifth, 'the general and the specific,' is applied, more or less consciously, in innumerable cases in modern law. The Travellers' Guide, handed to those spending a holiday abroad, forbids you 'to cash cheques on your sterling account, to borrow currency or to enter into any other agreement to obtain foreign currency' — clearly a provision which 'specialiter quibusdam enumeratis generatis subicet verbum quod specialia completatur.'

observation, consistent and useful.' (So, presumably, is the theory of relativity.) But (like the theory of relativity) it is not 'natural' — not even the first four norms — in the sense of 'obvious, readily hit upon by any student of these matters.' It is the naturalness of the rhetorical categories and methods in the former sense, their soundness as doctrine and in practice, which accounts for their adoption, in one form or another, in so many parts of the Hellenistic world. Recently, it has been shown that Philo was acquainted with them, and the conclusion has been drawn that he was influenced by Palestinian Rabbinism. But it is far more likely that he came across them in the course of his general studies at Alexandria. We have before us a science the beginnings of which may be traced back to Plato, Aristotle and their contemporaries. It recurs in Cicero, Hillel and Philo — with enormous differences in detail, yet au fond the same. Cicero did not sit at the feet of Hillel, nor Hillel at the feet of Cicero; and there was no need for Philo to go to Palestinian sources for this kind of teaching. As we saw, there are indeed signs that Hillel's ideas were partly imported from Egypt. The true explanation lies in the common Hellenistic background. Philosophical instruction was very similar in outline whether given at Rome, Jerusalem or Alexandria.

It is not necessary to dwell on the remaining norms of Hillel, beyond noting a clear parallel to the seventh, the rule that an ambiguity in the law may be settled by adducing the context, dhabhar hallamedh me'tinyano. The commandment 'Thou shalt not steal' is interpreted as referring to theft of a person, not of property, since it appears together with other capital crimes against a person, namely, murder and adultery.\(^{61}\) Cicero writes: 'It ought to be shewn that the ambiguous passage becomes intelligible from what precedes and comes after it.'\(^{62}\) It may well have been this norm of interpretation which Celsus had in mind when he declared, in discussing leges dotis, that 'it was not in accordance with the science of the civil law to judge or give

\(^{61}\) Mekhiltha ad loc., Bab Sanh. 86a.

\(^{62}\) De Inv. 2.40.117 ('ex superiore et ex inferiore scriptura docendum id quod quaeratur fieri perspicuum').
an opinion on the basis of a mere fragment of a lex, without inspecting the whole."

A few remarks may be added about terminology. We have already pointed out that, just as the Romans succeeded in latinizing the rhetorical notions they used, so the 'classical,' Tannaitic Rabbis succeeded in hebraizing them. There was no slavish, literal rendering. In fact, it is fascinating to watch the transformation the Hellenistic concepts underwent as they were freely adapted to the Jewish milieu. To take a small example, we mentioned above the introduction by Hillel of the antithesis 'a written Torah and an oral Torah,' an antithesis owing much to that of νόημα ἡγγαρίων and ἡγγαρίων or in scriptum and non scriptum or per manus traditum. Yet look at the Hebrew term for 'oral Torah: torah shabbd'al pe, 'Torah by mouth.' The words 'al pe, 'by mouth,' frequently signify 'by heart,' 'from memory,' and this meaning is certainly relevant. But for the Rabbis of the Talmud, a good many other ideas were evoked by the phrase. We need only consider passages like the following: 'According to the mouth of the Lord they rested, and according to the mouth of the Lord they journeyed; they kept the Lord according to the mouth of the Lord in the hand of Moses';

again, 'The Torah of thy mouth is better unto me than thousands of gold and silver; give me understanding that I may learn thy commandments;' or again, 'This book of the Torah shall not depart out of thy mouth, but thou shalt meditate therein day and night, that thou mayest observe to do according to all that is written therein.' The latter verse in particular must have been in Hillel's mind when he coined the antithesis in question (or in the mind of whoever coined it about that time). It advocates the constant study, interpretation, of Scripture, for the sake of being able scrupulously to fulfil all precepts. When we remember the function of 'a fence' around Scriptural law assigned to the tradition of the fathers in the age of Hillel, and when we consider that the verse quoted enjoins constant interpretation by saying that 'the Torah shall not depart out of thy mouth' and describes as the object the keeping of all 'that is written therein,' we can hardly doubt that here is a main root of Hillel's contrast between the 'written Torah' and the 'Torah by mouth.' The Hellenistic scheme has been completely Judaized.

Nevertheless there are instances of the Greek or Latin terms being still noticeable in the Hebrew. In some cases, this is almost inevitable. Rules concerning deduction from analogy will naturally operate with concepts like ἀποκαταστάσεις in Greek — as when Aristotle explains this method as the comparison of like with like, when both of them come under the same genus but one is more familiar than the other — simile or par. in Latin — as when Cicero says that 'the doubtful matter to be deduced must appear similar to one as to which there is certainty' or that 'like is compared to like' — shawe in Hebrew. Again, rules concerning general and specific laws could scarcely avoid expressions like καθολοῦν — κατὰ μέρος (καθ ἥκαστον), γενικῶν (περί ἔκαστον, περί ἐκάστου) — ἰδίων, generale (complecti-) — speciale (singula), kal — parat. However, on occasion, the Rabbis employ words less obviously suitable, when it is worth searching for the possible Greek or Latin model. The sixth of Hillel's norms is called keyotse bo bemqam 'aher, literally, 'as what is going out with it in another passage of Scripture.' The verse 'When Moses held up his hand Israel prevailed' is taken

practised. It is noteworthy that the verb ἄγγιν, 'to meditate,' is actually used as denoting 'to deduce a further law from an existing one' in Pal. Meg. 72b.

44 Rhet. 1.2.19 (ἡμών πρὸς ἡμῶν, ὅταν ἡμῶν μὲν ἤπει τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμίωτερον δὲ θάτερον τοῦ θατέρου).
45 De Inv. 2.50.150 ("ut id de quo quaeritur rei de qua constat simile esse videatur").
46 Top. 10.43 ("par pari comparatur").
47 Occurring in the second of Hillel's norms and several other Tannaitic rules of interpretation.
48 Ex. 17.11.
as meaning that Israel prevailed when directing their thoughts on high; "as is going out with it thou shalt least say, Make a serpent and set it upon a standard and every one that seeth it shall live" also means that they were healed when directing their thoughts on high. The phrase γονος ὑπ' (in Aramaic naphig be), 'going out with it,' in this sense of 'corresponding to,' is rare. Its use in the norm under discussion may well be due to συμβαίνω, which signifies not only 'to correspond to,' but also 'to follow from reasoning.'

Another case seems to be the familiar (shen) ne'emar, 'as it is said.' Like 'as it is written,' it exclusively introduces quotations from Scripture — never an oral tradition. It is tempting to explain this by the influence of γραγμός which, in rhetorical works, though literally 'what is said,' has the technical sense of 'the written document to be subjected to interpretation.' The Roman orators translated it by scriptum. The Rabbis, in addition to kathubh (Aramaic kethibh), 'it is written,' evolved a term more faithfully rendering the Greek: ne'emar, 'it is said.'

Num. 21:8.

Mishnah R. H. 3:8.

See Plato, Gorg. 479C (συλλογίζομαι τά συμβαίνοντα ἵν τοις μοίον), Phaedo 74A (κατά πάντα ταῦτα συμβάλλει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν ἐνα ἵν τοῖς θείοις), Aristotle, Nic. E. 7.11.1 (οὐ συμβαίνον ἤδη ταῦτα), Demosthenes, Contra Aristot. I 790C (ἐκ γὰρ ἐν ὑψῷ ἡ κατὰ τὰ ἱστορία συμβαίνει — the conclusion drawn is involved but, if the rhetorical scheme underlying it is recognized, makes perfect sense). Other terms deserving consideration in this connection are διεξαγόμενος προς τινα, 'to expound' (e. g. Plato, Laws 9.857E) and even the Latin (per)venire (e. g. Cicero, De Inv. 2.50.148 f., 152 — see above, p. 247 n. 25).


The fact that later scholiasts emphasize that the spoken word also may form a γραγμός only confirms the original limitation. See also the next footnote.

They soon noticed that scriptum in this technical sense might consist in a purely verbal utterance; see e. g. Quintilian 7:5:6. Cp. the preceding footnote.

In conclusion, attention may be drawn to four points that should be borne in mind when these matters are pursued in greater detail.

First, the influence of Hellenistic philosophy was not confined to the period of Hillel. It had started before; and it went on afterwards, in an increasing degree, for a long time. The systems of interpretation advocated by Ishmael and Akiba some 150 years later can be understood only against the background of the rhetorical teaching of the time. Josiah, a disciple of Ishmael, about the middle of the 2nd century A. C., favoured the method of sēres: a verse at first sight illogical may be made logical by re-arranging its parts. In Num. 9:6 ff., we are told that certain men brought a problem 'before Moses and before Aaron' and that Moses transmitted it to God, thus obtaining the correct solution. Josiah explains that the passage cited must be re-arranged: the men evidently came first before Aaron, who did not know, and then before Moses, who approached God. The name of the method is curious, the literal meaning of sēres being 'to castrate.' It becomes intelligible, however, when we remember that τέμνων also signifies 'to castrate,' 'to divide logically,' 'to distinguish,' τοῦμ 'castration,' 'logical division,' 'distinction,' 'precision of expression,' 'caesura.' Even ideas which prima facie one would incline to put down as peculiarly Rabbinic may turn out to have been, if not borrowed from rhetoric, at least supported, helped on, by it. The oral Torah, in the eyes of the Rabbis, is the particular glory of Israel; the gentiles cannot grasp the secret, mysterious way Scripture is interpreted.

Cicero, as an argument in favour of 'interpretation,' i. e. of following the spirit rather than the letter of a statute, refers to the lawmaker's decree that judges must be of a certain rank and age, capable not only, as anybody would be, of reciting a statute, but also of discovering its intention: 'if the author of a statute committed his work-to simple men and primitive judges, he would diligently put down every detail, but since he knows how well qualified the judges

Siphra ad loc.

Tanhuma Wayyera par. 6 on Gen. 18:17.
will be, he does not add what he deems to be obvious. 31 It is the same thing in a Roman dress. 32

Secondly, the influence of Hellenistic philosophy was not confined to the domain of interpretation. Such fundamental matters as the distinction between mishpatim, rational, natural laws, ‘commandments which, were they not laid down, would have to be laid down,’ and haggath, inexplicable laws, ‘commandments which the evil impulse and the heathens refute,’ 33 are not of purely Jewish origin; and even the teaching that ‘you have no right to criticize the haggath’ 34 was probably a commonplace before Midrash. He has a profound discussion as to how far it is proper ‘to be wiser than the laws’ 35 — this sounds like a reference to an earlier slogan —, and Aristotle advises us, if our case is favoured by a statute which, though still technically in force, is clearly obsolete, to argue ‘that there is no advantage in being wiser than the physician, for an error of the latter is less harmful than the habit of disobeying the authority; and to try to be wiser than the laws is precisely what is forbidden in the best of them.’ 36

Students of Roman law are familiar with the statements by Julian, ‘It is impossible to give reasons for everything that our forefathers laid down,’ 37 and by Neratius, ‘Wherefore it is not correct to inquire into the reasons of what they laid down, otherwise much that is secure would be undermined.’ 38

Thirdly, if the Roman and Greek sources can help us to elucidate the Jewish side, the converse is also true. To some extent, this may have become clear already. But to take a fresh example, about 200 B. C., Aelius Paetus wrote a ‘tripertia,’ where ‘the law of the XII Tables was given first, then the interpretation was joined to it and finally the legis activ was appended.’ 39 Scholars are still divided as to whether there were three large parts — first the complete XII Tables, next all results of interpretation and then a list of all legis actiones — or whether each provision of the XII Tables (or each group of provisions) was accompanied by its interpretation and legis activo. Comparison of the Rabbinic material should settle the controversy in favour of the latter alternative. Aelius Paetus wrote a Midrash. The old, expositional (as distinct from the homiletical) Midrash takes the form of a running commentary on Scripture. 40 It is significant, however, that there is nothing on the Jewish side to correspond to the legis activo. So even here, no sooner have we noted a parallel than we are struck by the profound difference between the two legal systems.

This brings us to the fourth and last point. The next task, of course, is to conduct a thorough inquiry into the debt of Talmudic jurisprudence to Hellenistic rhetoric. The present study is only

---

31 De Inv. 2.47.139 (‘demonstrabit illum scriptorem, si scripta sua stultis hominibus et barbaris judicibus committere omnia summa diligentia perscripturum fuisse; nunc vero, quod intellexerit quales viri res judicaturi essent, idcirco eum quae perspicua videret esse non adscripsisse’).

32 Needless to say, an advocate using Cicero’s argument would at the same time flatter the judges. Even this element was hardly unmeaning to the Rabbis: the people would be more willing to shoulder the burden of the oral Law if that gave them a feeling of superiority.

33 Siphra on Lev. 18.4, Bab. Yoma 67b.

34 Ib.

35 Statesman 299C (οιδας γαρ δε των νωμων ειναι συστητων).

36 Rhet. 1.15.12 (ου λατετει παρααριστηθαι των λατρων, οι γαρ τοσοον βλακτει η άμαρτια του λατρου δοσι το διεξαθαι απειδεα των άρχων και δι των νωμων συστητων ζητεται ειναι τοις ουν τινι εν τοις έκαστοις νωμοις άπαραγεται). The argument is strongly influenced by Plato. Even the comparison with the physician occurs in Statesman 294B.

37 D. 1.3.20 (‘non omnium quae a maioribus constituta sunt ratio reddi potest’).

38 D. 1.3.21 (‘et ideo rationes eorum quae constitutur inquiri non oporteat, aliquin multa ex his quae certa sunt subvertentur’).

39 D. 1.2.2.38 (‘lege XII tabularum praeposita iungitur interpretatio, deinque subtextit legis activo’). The same threefold division comes earlier on in the same fragment, in the first half of 1.2.2.12 (that the part up to ‘continuit’ goes back to an older source than the rest is suggested by the fact that the second half begins by ‘aut plebiscitum’ instead of ‘aut est plebiscitum’), and it recurs in 1.3.13.

40 True, the Midrash was not written down till long after the period of the ‘tripertia.’ But in its oral form, it certainly dates from the 1st century B. C. (The recent discovery of a homiletical Midrash on Habakkuk 1.1, possibly written down in the 1st century B. C., is significant in this connection: the first steps towards a Halakhic Midrash can hardly be later.) Moreover, the Targum, the free rendering of Scripture into the vernacular for use in liturgy, is as old as Aelius, and the rule was that each verse of Scripture was at once to be followed by its paraphrase.
a first beginning, intended to open the subject and to shew that some debt there is, but to do no more. We have merely touched the fringe. Yet it is greatly to be hoped that, once this immediate task has been carried out, with all that belongs to it (it will, for example, be necessary to answer such subsidiary questions as whether the influence was greater or smaller at different times and on different schools, and through what channels it was chiefly exercised), the second, subtler one will not be forgotten: a working out of the differences between Greek and Roman rhetoric and Talmudic rhetoric, of the factors that determined the Rabbinic selection of certain notions and rejection of others, and of the changes that the Hellenistic concepts suffered—singly and as a system—in the course of being transferred to an alien soil.